The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false: it is not true. Herman Cappelen The moral rights of the author have been asserted. First Edition published in Impression: 1. All rights reserved. No part of this. Liberating Content. The Inessential Indexical. Philosophy without Intuitions Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever Oxford University Press, forthcoming
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Philosophy without Intuitions – Hardcover – Herman Cappelen – Oxford University Press
Classical, Early, and Medieval Plays and Playwrights: But he finds none. At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of engaging in somewhat irresponsible use of ‘intuition’-vocabulary.
Joel Pust – – Routledge.
He is the author of many papers and three books: Where Cappelen and Deutsch Go Wrong. Nor are we told in much detail how the role or method is conceived.
The Aim of Belief Timothy Chan. This assumption also underlines the entire experimental philosophy movement: By my lights, contemporary philosophical methodology could do with more awareness of this point and with more direct attempts to tackle it. This position weakens Cappelen’s insistence that no self-respecting philosopher would ever use an unreflective pre-theoretic judgment as evidence for a theory.
Some Strategies for Charitable Reinterpretation. Martin marked it as to-read Jul 09, The reason is simple: Each argument type is assessed in turn, and it’s concluded that neither in the end supports a viable version of Centrality. What I want to focus on, however, is that we’re not provided with a diagnostic for the first practice-referencing feature in particular — intuitions’ role in the method of cases.
Subscriber Login Email Address. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Nat marked it as to-read Apr hherman, The Inessential Indexical is available at Amazon.
Seems withiut me that Cappelen let his normative biases conceptual analysis is impossible so no one should do it; the pre-theoretic common ground is only accessible via empirical experience which should be investigated blind him to the descriptive fact that many people DO practice conceptual analysis and DO unreflectively rely on pre-theoretic common ground without acknowledging its empirical investigatable roots. Search our webpages Search.
Philosophy Without Intuitions by Herman Cappelen
That would be exciting. Here’s a weak but perfectly plausible claim about the use of ‘intuition’ and cognates among a sizeable contingent of contemporary analytic philosophers: Centrality is supposed to be neutral on this issue, too. Sign in Create an account.
Find it on Scholar. I still think that paradigms serve the purpose: Preface and Intuitjons 1. To avoid this kind of collapse, we must take the argument from ‘intuition’-talk to have a stronger premise: And it doesn’t help to take these philosophers ‘at their word’: Everyone knows that the term “intuition” and “intuitively”, etc. His suggestion that metaphilosophers should examine specific cases of people philosophizing is right on.
Classical, Early, and Medieval Poetry and Poets: Our alleged reliance on the intuitive makes many philosophers who don’t work on meta-philosophy concerned about their own discipline: Relativism and Monadic Truth is available at Amazon. My prediction is that this fine book will significantly advance the debate about the place of perspective and indexicality in human thought and action.
Nor does anything turn on Centrality being framed in terms of evidence — rather than, say, justificationor reason s. Our alleged reliance on the intuitive makes many philosophers who don’t work on meta-philosophy concerned about their own discipline: Experimental philosophy Bibliography Index.
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